

A New Church: From Medellin to Puebla

The church of silence is what observers dubbed the Latin American church at Vatican Council II. The relative lack of impact by the largest regional church in the world was a poor harbinger of what was to take place three years later at the CELAM conference at Medellín. Indeed few, inside or outside the church, were prepared for what was to happen at Medellín. The progressive document (more progressive than Vatican II) of the Medellín conference was very much out of step with a church that seemed not to have changed much in almost five hundred years.

For many in the church, 1966, the year after Vatican II, was a time to catch up on work long overdue at home and also a period in which to catch one's breath. The prolonged and intense efforts of a year of preparation and four years of involvement in the council left most participants temporarily exhausted.

Then, toward the end of 1966, the two-year process of preparation for the Medellín conference began. These preparations were often hidden from the view of those who did not take part directly. Moreover, because of the vastness of the region and the inferior quality of communication across national lines, it was difficult to comprehend all aspects of what was taking place.

The key integrator of the Latin American church, Bishop Larraín, died in an auto accident in early 1966. Nonetheless, the highest level of leadership of the Latin American church carried on his initiative with no loss of momentum. Later in 1966, at its tenth annual meeting and its first since Vatican II, CELAM turned to the discussion of the development and integration of Latin America. The bishops made a pivotal decision that, although seemingly of little consequence, set a new direction for the forthcoming extraordinary conference at Medellín. In contrast to the ineffectual first extraordinary conference at Rio, which had canonical representation (delegates from each ecclesiastical region), Medellín would have pastoral representation (delegates from functional or apostolic sectors). The decision was crucial: it meant that the church would be analyzed and defined from the bottom up. No wonder, then, that Norman Gall writing on the church shortly after the Medellín conference would describe it as the "people of God" rather than the "hierarchy of God."⁽¹⁾

The same CELAM meeting brought another structural change of note: the conference would use a now famous methodology that would follow the trinomial of the Vatican Council *Gaudium et Spes* (The Church in the Modern World): facts/reflection/ recommendations. The change in methodology was monumental: it represented a shift from a perspective that was dogmatic, deductive and top-to-bottom to one that was exploratory, inductive, and bottom-to-top. If nothing more than this structural change had been made, a giant step would have been taken. In fact, much more advancement than just methodological would be achieved.

During the two years of preparation, small conferences, workshops, and think-tank sessions worked on the changes that the Medellín conference would reflect. Those who took part in the preparatory steps and in the conference itself recalled later the euphoria they experienced in the days of building something new. New leadership networks were the dynamo that made the enterprise energetic and productive. Their members ensured that changes would take place at Medellín.

The standard interpretation of what the conference achieved is that it applied Vatican II to Latin America. This would be a major achievement, one that no other regional church attempted. Nonetheless, Oliveros and others argue that what took place at Medellín was an interpretation of Vatican II in the light of the Latin American situation -- rather than simply an application.⁽²⁾ The conference went beyond Vatican II. It broke new theological and ideological ground. The rest of this book elaborates that view.

Assimilating Vatican II

What was taking place in the period from the end of Vatican II to the Medellín meeting was a twin process of assimilation (of Vatican II) and Latinamericanization (the process of reflecting on the human and religious situation in Latin America and interpreting that situation in the light of Vatican II). Theologians assiduously studied the "new" theology expressed at Vatican II. Social scientists took on the task of the description and analysis of the Latin American situation. The processes acted as new engines for a balky old freighter. At first the ship moved rather uncertainly, but then, with the shedding of barnacles and with new energy sources, it sailed steadily on course.

The process of assimilating Vatican II began slowly with the commencement of the council meetings in 1962. At first the communication to Latin America of what was taking place in Rome was spotty and thin. The inability on the part of bishops and periti to share fully what was taking place at the council was due in part to theological ignorance.

In retrospect, too, one can sense that the Latin American bishops and many of their advisors suffered cultural shock, and understandably so. Many of the questions being discussed by the council were not "their" questions or at least not issues addressed in a way that would have been pertinent to Latin America. In many ways Vatican II witnessed a clash of cultures. The Europeans (and to a lesser degree participants from other developed countries) won the conflict. It was not an explicitly conscious conflict but it was real. European bishops and experts led the council in the direction of European interests. The central theme and the motivation of John XXIII in calling the council was aggiornamento. For the church of the developed world and European civilization, this meant bringing the church up to date about its place in the modern (European) world. Specifically, it meant addressing questions of faith or lack of it in a scientific age.

Aggiornamento would eventually mean something very different in the Latin American situation. This became increasingly clear to the theological and pastoral experts as they prepared for the Medellín conference. In many ways Latinamericanization has been a wrenching process, one not completed by Medellín, although a good beginning was made there. It entailed the pain of a

creative enterprise, intensified by coming after four arduous years at the council and by being under the gun of the forthcoming conference. More, it was an uprooting of the Latin Americans from their European theological soil, at least in part. It meant growing on their own, away from the parental trunk, though clearly remaining an offshoot. No longer could the Latin American church be content with derivative thought. It was a process similar to that of a young man thinking his own thoughts and making his own plans, though guided by teachers and parents.

The process of thinking their own thoughts also meant that Latin Americans had to turn away from (although usually not all the way) European theologians, some of whom had been their mentors. The Latin Americans removed heroes such as Johannes Metz (political theology) and Jürgen Moltmann (theology of hope) from the main niches of their theological pantheon. In turn, Europeans (with some exceptions, such as Edward Schillebeeckx) found it difficult to understand what the Latin Americans were saying, why former students had changed, and why they were so demanding.

At the time of the Vatican council, *aggiornamento* for many Latin American bishops meant a simpler process than it did at Medellín. Many of them perceived *aggiornamento* in terms of a request of the pope to bring the church up to date. Theirs was often a passive response, one of attempting to learn what to do and then of muddling through some kind of implementation.

As all social learning, the assimilation and implementation of Vatican II took place in Latin America at considerably varying rates. Vatican II had a strong effect almost immediately in such places as Chile and parts of Brazil, regional churches that had updated themselves before Vatican II. The council had a much more muted and indirect impact in other countries, such as Mexico. Only after Medellín and especially in preparing for and experiencing Puebla did the Mexican church begin to feel the fuller impact of the Vatican council. The reasons for the delayed effect will be discussed later.

In countries where Vatican II had a more immediate effect a large-scale effort of *difusión* began. *Difusión*, the dissemination of *aggiornamento* ideas on a massive scale, took shape in the last two years of the council and continued thereafter. In many countries thousands of small groups sprang into existence to find out what had happened at Vatican II and to reflect on what the council meant personally and for the world in which they lived. Often these groups were started spontaneously by persons curious about the new theology of the council or about new practices proposed, especially in worship.

Here a convergence occurred. The thousands of active members of Catholic Action and other lay movements became an instant audience for the teaching of Vatican II and for the theology that undergirded the conciliar deliberations. They and their chaplains rushed to obtain and to discuss booklets containing council documents or popular commentaries.

The meshing of "new" ideology and "old" movement did not always proceed smoothly, as we shall see in the case of Catholic Action and liberation theology. Many Catholic activists evaluated lay movements such as the *Cursillos de cristiandad* or the Legion of Mary as being out of step with Vatican II. They believed that the orientation of the *Cursillo* and the Legion to "delivering

the lay person to the doorstep of the parish office" did not reflect what were supposed to be the new authority relationships within the church.

Because of the example of Vatican II, its exploratory attitude, and its use of sacred scripture in a "new" way, many biblical study groups came into existence. Popular and inexpensive Spanish versions of the Bible appeared as part of this biblical movement. Millions of copies of the Bible were sold or distributed in the years after Vatican II.

Catholics in a number of places experienced another novelty: they began to learn about themselves and their church in the company of Protestants. This seemed to happen overnight in some places; elsewhere it has still not happened. But a general trend of openness to other religions had begun.

Few places reflect better the assimilation of Vatican II, the learning process that had begun, and the changes that have taken place, than the bookstore Libreria San Pablo. The Paulinas, a community of sisters dedicated to the printing and dissemination of Catholic teaching, run the bookstore in midtown La Paz. Before Vatican II had much impact, the bookstore resembled a garden of pious books and devotional statues. Slowly the store began to change. First came council documents, then cautious commentaries often written by old-school Spanish or Italian seminary professors attempting to show how the council was in conformity with past teaching. Before long, the demand for the new theologians, the masterminds of the council -- Yves Congar, Karl Rahner, Edward Schillebeeckx, Hans Küng, Henri de Lubac -- could hardly be met. Within another year appeared commentaries by Protestants favorable to the council, and then simply books by Protestants. Prospective readers often did not know a writer's background, nor did it matter to them. The Libreria San Pablo moved into new quarters for its now large selection of contemporary books and publications.

Besides being a symbol of the progressive, open-minded, and ecumenical aspects of the process of assimilation that was taking place, the bookstore also reflected the small, middle-class, elitist stage of social learning taking place in the church. Some fifty miles away, Bishop Adhemar Ezquivel and his team were preparing rural Amerindians to become church leaders through study of Vatican II. In general, though, for most persons at the grassroots in the late 1960s, the impact of Vatican II was very slight.

In contrast with the United States where many religious publishing houses went out of business or were absorbed by secular houses, religious book and magazine publishing in or for Latin America has boomed. Chicago, with the largest Catholic population of any diocese in the U.S.A., no longer supports a Catholic bookstore in the Loop. Mexico City has several Catholic bookstores in the Zócolo area and supports one of the largest religious bookstores in the world, Librería Parroquial. The latter resembles a department store, with three floors of books and thousands of titles.

Latinamericanization

The other process facing the church, that of interpreting Vatican II from the viewpoint of the Latin American situation, was more complex, because it was more original than the process of

assimilation. Two major interacting tasks were called for: first, a realistic analysis and delineation of the human and religious situation in Latin America and, second a theological reinterpretation, the creation of a Latin American theology in the light of Vatican II. Neither were easy tasks. The remainder of this chapter and the following chapter enlarge on the results or lack of results of these two tasks.

As is often the case, the task called for by higher administrators already was being attended to by entrepreneurs in the field. Two distinct groups had begun work on the analysis of the human and religious situation of the region. The first of these can be described as development institutes -- institutes dedicated to social and religious research, dissemination of research results, and, often, continuing adult education. These institutes drew their inspiration from diverse immediate sources but in general developed out of the same general rationale: the need for Christian involvement in the world (that is, local and national development) and, along with it, the need for facts and for the analysis of causes of local and national situations, both social and religious.

Three of the main sources of inspiration for the institutes were François Houtart of Louvain University, French Dominican Louis Joseph Lebreton, and the Society of Jesus. Houtart and his collaborator Emile Pin were among the first in the field. Houtart first helped to set up centers for socio-religious research in Bogotá and Rio de Janeiro. Then as more centers were started (although not always through Houtart) he created a formal network: FERES (Federation of Religious and Social Studies). FERES became increasingly transnational with a Latin American branch anchored by the Bogotá and Rio centers. Louvain functioned as the center of the network, coordinating information, urging what its field consultants perceived as needed lines of research, and obtaining from time to time money and personnel for collaborative studies.

One of the first of these projects, a very ambitious one, took place in the early 1960s. FERES undertook historical and "sociographical" studies of each Latin American country and church, together with studies on specialized themes, such as the clergy. On the Latin American side, Gustavo Pérez Ramírez and Alfonso Gregory coordinated the massive effort, which was done with limited resources. FERES efficiently published the results in a series of paperbacks and widely distributed them throughout Latin America.

The studies were rather superficial reports that repeated facts familiar to most historians and social scientists. They were almost devoid of analysis. Thus they are not remarkable as landmark case studies. But they were important for other reasons. First, they brought together a number of isolated facts that tended to escape the attention of church administrators and pastoral workers. Secondly, up to that time in Latin America, it was not common to pay more attention to "facts" than to predigested theory. Thirdly, the church was beginning to tell the truth about itself and the series helped put together a picture that was clear in some of its outlines, if blurry in detail. It was the first attempt of the Latin American church to make use of social science, and the effort widened the vision of many bishops.

Until 1962 most bishops in Latin America experienced isolation from other bishops and from the larger church organization to a degree unknown in the United States since the Civil War. Only rarely did the bishops meet within their own countries, and then only for episodic, ad hoc crises.

Moreover, even in their own dioceses, bishops remained isolated in their see cities. They lacked resources and a pastoral vision that would lead them out to the countryside or into the neighborhoods of provincial capitals. Instead they acted out the cultural role of the patrón receiving his clientes, a cultural pattern familiar for more than four hundred years. Many bishops seldom or never ventured out of their see cities, except for occasional visits to the national capital. Up to the early 1960s, no one in a remote diocese in Peru could recall a bishop ever visiting a parish outside the city, despite the fact that the vast majority of Catholics resided in the countryside.

Thus, up to Vatican II most bishops possessed a vision of the church that was largely limited to their own dioceses and, at that, to one city. They contented themselves with selective reports from other parts of their jurisdiction. Hence, the use even of primitive sociological or historical materials that developed a larger sense of the national church or of the Latin American church represented a major advance.

Although Latin American bishops differed notably from bishops in the developed world in their isolation and lack of national organizational structures, nonetheless the Latin American *modus operandi* gave the bishops an advantage over their North American or European counterparts. Latin American bishops spent much of their day "receiving" persons, most of them ordinary citizens with a variety of problems. This contact has given many Latin American bishops a sense of the people that is lacking in many bishops of the developed world.

This sense of people, even though sometimes shaped on the skew toward the pious and dependent, helps to explain the relatively ready acceptance at Medellín and the reaffirmation at Puebla of the Latin American bishops' preferential option for the poor in pastoral planning. The much lower percentage of the poor and the relative structural isolation from the poor make such an option relatively unthinkable in the U.S.A. or Europe. The contrast between North America and Latin America emphasizes the impact of differences in structured interactions of bishops and laity.

Louis Joseph Lebret and his collaborators were most active in Uruguay, Argentina, and Bolivia. Paul Ramlot, Lebret's representative in Latin America, established the Centro de Economía y Humanismo (Center for Economy and Humanism) in Montevideo, and later IEPAL (Institute of Political Studies for Latin America) in Buenos Aires. North American Dominicans, loosely following Lebret's lead, founded IBEAS (Bolivian Institute for Social Study and Action) in La Paz.

The Jesuits, best known in Latin America for prestigious high schools and universities, began in the 1960s to emphasize social study and action centers on a typically comprehensive basis. Word came down through the ranks that the Jesuits should establish in each Latin American country a CIAS (Center for Social Investigation and Action). This general directive took on some variation from country to country but the commitment to social study and action was clear and steady. In countries where a center similar in conception to CIAS was already established, the Jesuits joined in collaborative effort, as Pedro Negre did at IBEAS. The CIAS idea was sometimes tailored to

fit already existing structures within established universities, such as the Centro Bellarmino in Santiago, the grandfather of social research and action centers in Latin America.

The Jesuits also established notable specialized institutes that drew on the CIAS idea. In two of them-CEE (Center for Educational Studies) in Mexico City, and CIE (Center for Educational Investigation) in Buenos Aires-Jesuit researchers and collaborators researched and published widely on the place of education in society. At the grassroots level in Bolivia, Jesuit Javier Albó, with the help of others, established CIPCA, a center for the study and promotion of Aymara Indian culture.

The CIAS idea was important to the Jesuits and to the Latin American church for a variety of reasons. A number of the more talented, younger Latin American Jesuits went off to major universities, usually outside Latin America, to obtain advanced degrees in social science or education. Many of them later assumed leadership within the social science enterprise, government circles (as in Nicaragua), the theology of liberation, or church administration.

More importantly, the CIAS model led the Jesuits away from merely academic concerns to emphasis on social problems. This major shift has had important consequences for the Jesuits and for Latin American society. Nowhere is this more evident than in Paraguay or in Central America where Jesuit social commentators and activists helped the church confront manifestly unjust social structures. In Paraguay and El Salvador the Jesuits as a group have been threatened with mass expulsion or murder. They withstood the challenge but at the cost of individual exile or assassination.

With the mushrooming of social research and action centers, FERES was able to create a network of centers throughout most of Latin America. From initiatives of those centers and from collaborative research, a clearer and clearer view of the human and religious situation in Latin America emerged. But the description of the region from the accumulation of statistics led to more and deeper questions. Why was Latin America underdeveloped? Why were so many millions pushed to or kept at the margins of society?(3) A crisis was occurring within the social sciences in Latin America, especially within sociology and economics departments in universities. The crisis had to do with trying to explain Latin American underdevelopment.

The "development" model was proposed for Latin America and the Third World because of the success of the reconstruction of Europe and Japan through the Marshall Plan. The U.S.A. in the late 1950s and the 1960s turned much of its attention to Latin America, in part to keep the western hemisphere free of communism. Scores of experts, including military advisors, and shipments of goods, including large amounts of military supplies, descended on Latin America under Point Four of the Marshall Plan and military assistance agreements. Because the Marshall Plan had worked so successfully with former enemies, why not apply essentially the same plan to friends to the south?

U.N. Secretary General U Thant and President John Kennedy helped focus on the crisis. U Thant declared the 1960s a decade of development; Kennedy helped to concretize the same ideas of development for Latin America through the Alliance for Progress. After initial enthusiasm

expressed by Latin Americans at the Punta del Este meeting that cemented the alliance, disillusionment set in for Latin American economists and sociologists.

The Point Four plan was essentially flawed, as became apparent with the passing of years and with little of the progress that had been evident in Europe and Japan. Planners turned to economists for new insights. Pioneers among the economists, such as Theodore Schultz at the University of Chicago, began to focus on the idea of human resources. The difference, they said, between Germany/Japan and Latin America was the human resources that had made recovery relatively simple in Germany and Japan, given large amounts of capital. Latin America needed education and training: that would lead to a sufficient level of human resources. Then, with capital infusion, the countries would begin to "take off," to use Walt Rostow's term.

Import substitution through domestic industrialization became another key theme of planners. International banks and monetary funds were set up to assist in this process. The InterAmerican Development Bank, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) soon had a strong hand on the helm. Large private-sector banks, especially from the U.S.A., also made their way south. Their branch offices grew up all over Latin America. These banks soon were filling their U.S. headquarters with Latin American profits in a way never dreamed possible. Especially Citicorp, Bank America, and Chase Manhattan received increasingly substantial profits from their Latin American operations.

Not long after the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) and Latin American governments drew up the basic game plan for Latin America through the Alliance for Progress, many Latin American economists and social scientists began their own analyses of the development plan. In brief, they became convinced that any development that took place would be *dependent* development. Economic progress of their countries would take place especially to the profit of the developed world. This was so because the developed countries bought raw materials from Latin America at low prices and then sold it manufactured goods at a handsome profit. Later, as domestic industrialization took place, multinational companies of the developed world would move into the process and send profits back home.

The kind of development that many Latin American analysts saw taking place was uneven and inequitable. Certain sectors of Latin American society benefited (sometimes mightily) from economic progress, and other sectors fell further behind. The poor would get poorer, they said. And they were right.

The force of this early formulation of the dependency argument was not lost on young political activists who joined the discussion more fully in their university years. Nor was the argument lost on the Latin American church (though it took longer for the church, which had only recently joined discussion with social scientists and acquired a sense of the question). Nonetheless, within the two-year period of formal preparation for the Medellín conference, the Latin American church at its core (that of progressive experts and the bishops who listened to them) understood the dependency argument and stood ready to promote it at Medellín.

Another convergence thus occurred, this time between theologians and social scientists. And it

occurred at precisely the time when sociologists and economists were focusing on the fact of *dependencia*. Increasingly thereafter documents written in preparation for the Medellín conference incorporated *dependencia* in their analysis. (The dependency argument presented here reflects its formulations in the late 1960s. The argument has since advanced through additional elaboration.)

The pace of social understanding, of evolution of positions within the church, would stun observers. When a CELAM preparatory meeting at Mar de Plata, Argentina, in 1966 discussed development and integration in Latin America, the group did so in traditional terms, those similar to ones used by the World Bank or the Alliance for Progress. By the time of a CELAM preparatory meeting at Itapoan Bahia, Brazil, in May 1968, the analysis was beginning to take a new turn. For one thing, the church was now talking about itself more actively than ever before—for example, in terms of "the presence of the church in the process of change in Latin America."⁽⁴⁾ More, the Itapoan meeting incorporated the description and analysis of the socio-economic realities of Latin America as formulated by many Latin American economists and social scientists. The group took for granted the fact of dependence: "Underdevelopment in Latin America is the by-product of the capitalist development of the Western world." The Medellín conference would accept and enlarge on that line of analysis.

The first task in constructing a Latin American interpretation of Vatican II -- analysis of the human and religious situation -- was taking definite shape. The second task -- a theological reinterpretation of Latin America, in effect the creation of a Latin American theology in the light of Vatican II -- was also beginning. Based on social analysis, Latin American theology began to shape itself. Faced with domination and dependence, Latin American theologians turned to the theme of liberation. A new theology was taking shape.

Formal Preparations for Medellín

Each of the national churches was invited to have a hand in preparing for the Medellín conference. Questionnaires were sent out, some consultations were held, and the bishops discussed the forthcoming conference within their newly formed or newly strengthened national episcopal councils. But the most important preparations were taking place within the commissions and institutes formed by CELAM.

CELAM commissions and institutes began conducting consultations and study meetings to prepare for the writing of working documents. These meetings became the most important steps leading to the final Medellín document. Several meetings produced especially salient documents in terms of basic questions raised or of positions later taken. Of these the most important meetings took place at Baños, Ecuador, June 1966, on education, ministry, and social action; at Mar de Plata, October 1966, on development and integration of Latin America; at Buga, Colombia, February 1967, on the mission of the Catholic university in Latin America; at Melgar, Colombia, April 1968, on the missions; at Itapoan, 1968, a follow-up of the Mar de Plata meetings; and at Medellín, August 1968, on catechesis.

Experts were drawn from all over Latin America to produce *ponencias* (position papers) or to

react to *ponencias* and then rewrite them into fuller working papers. Many experts were members of the new leadership networks mentioned earlier. To their numbers were added new members, experts in one field or another who had been working in their own national context somewhat isolated from the transnational networks. Thus those networks expanded and reshaped themselves for the purpose of influencing the outcome of the Medellín conference. Specialists from various fields and disciplines interacted in preparatory consultations. This widened and deepened the perspectives of the participants. The dynamics of their meetings were such that advances in theological and practical thinking were made rather easily. Many of the ideas emanating from Vatican II and from social analysis led the specialists to conclusions that were later taken for granted by Medellín participants who had taken part in preliminary consultations. In effect, the conference outcome was being determined even before the conference began.

None of the consultations mentioned dealt directly with theology, much less the theology of liberation. Yet theologians participated actively in the consultations and often acted as the principal writers of *ponencias*. Gustavo Gutiérrez, Eduardo Pironio, José Comblin, and others excelled at this type of activity. Thus theological and not simply organizational concerns were placed at the heart of the conference preparations. Theologians, though, had to focus their thoughts on practical affairs such as education, missions, and social action. It was theology done at the side of those immersed in practical activities -- a considerable change from the theology that had typically been taught in Latin American schools of theology.

Prophets and Integrators at Work

Apart from formal CELAM consultations, a small group composed almost entirely of theologians was meeting to test and exchange ideas. Halfway through the four-year Vatican II period -- March 1964 -- they met on Latin American soil, probably for the first time. To the quiet, picturesque university town of Petrópolis, Brazil, Monsignor Ivan Illich invited a select group of intellectuals for a meeting on Latin American theology.

In the U.S.A. Illich is best known for his ideas on the futility of schooling and for his broadsides on the medical profession. In 1964 Illich was the consummate leadership figure in Latin America. He oscillated between his roles as diagnostician and integrator. A Central European aristocrat, he became a New York City pastor, then head of two training schools for missionaries set up through funds from the U.S.A. at Petrópolis and at Cuernavaca, Mexico. Illich broadened the mandate given him and made the language schools into institutions with think-tank operations, replete with publication and documentation services.

Illich functioned well at bringing together "idea" persons, especially those with ideas similar to his own, which at the time ran along the line of radical latinamericanization of Latin American churches. The Petrópolis meeting took a giant step in that direction. Juan Luis Segundo, Gustavo Gutiérrez, and Lucio Gera presented probably the most influential position papers at the meeting. They opened the way toward a Latin American theology and expressed concerns that were to become richer, more systematic statements of liberation thought that began appearing four years later.

The inner circle that began at Petrópolis expanded through a series of informal meetings over the next four years. In 1965 alone, the group (which had flexible boundaries) met in June at Bogotá, and in July at Cuernavaca and Havana. Another pioneering network was being solidly established.

A further important network in the life of the Latin American church owed its inspiration to liberal Protestant churches and its financial resources mostly to outside sources, especially to the National Council of Churches (U.S.A.). ISAL (Church and Society in Latin America) began in Buenos Aires and Montevideo and branched out to the north and west. Eventually the movement became very influential, especially in Bolivia, where the majority of its members were Catholic priests or sisters.

Ecumenical cooperation became easier because the movement focused more on issues than it did on theology as such or on theological differences. The movement did include, however, a number of important Latin American theologians, especially Rubem Alves and Julio de Santa Ana (Protestants) and Hugo Assmann (Catholic). Richard Shaull, a Princeton theologian with longstanding contacts in Latin America, was influential at the beginning of the movement.

Some have seen in ISAL the importation of ideas that were largely North American, foreign to the real interests of Latin America. Thus the brooding concern about violence, which at times marked ISAL discussions, was thought to be drawn more from what was happening in the U.S.A. in response to the Vietnam crisis than from any realistic appraisal of the Latin American situation. In an interview Ivan Vallier concluded that ISAL meant little more than the funneling of money from pews in the U.S.A. into a revolutionary movement fueled with ideas from Princeton Seminary. (This was unfair to the Seminary.)

Crisis and Response in Latin America

Such an extreme interpretation has to be tempered by an understanding of what was taking place in Latin America in the 1960s. The idea of violence occurred to more than one Christian activist as a solution to a situation believed to be unjust. Their prototype was Father Camilo Torres. Torres joined a number of other Latin Americans, most notably Gustavo Gutiérrez, studying at Louvain University. Torres returned to Colombia in 1962 to become national chaplain to the university student movement. In 1966 he was killed by Colombian army bullets on his first armed foray as a guerrilla. For a few years his writings received considerable attention in Latin America and the U.S.A.

Three years after his death, a number of young activists and university students in Bolivia started guerrilla activity designed to bring down the government, in Teoponte, a village in the Los Yungas region, near La Paz. Like Torres, a number of the guerrillas joined the movement out of what they believed to be Christian motivation, convinced that revolution was the last recourse in working for a just society. Like Torres too, many of the guerrillas died in combat. (One of them was Néstor Paz, a man of considerable writing skill, who describes his thoughts on joining the movement in *My Life for My Friends*. (5))

The Teoponte movement was but one of the more romantic of the guerrilla movements that were

being created in Latin America in the 1960s. Many of the movements employed FLN (National Liberation Front) or a similar title; almost always liberation was part of their self-designation. Among the movements, the best known for some time were the often boldly dramatic Tupumaros of Uruguay.

These groups drew their inspiration from a variety of founts that included a detailed knowledge of Mao Tse-tung's philosophy, or more commonly a vague desire for "socialism." Often groups could agree on neither ideology nor tactics. Nonetheless, two general influences affected them all. The first was Fidel Castro's overthrow of a very corrupt government. His small guerrilla movement was successful despite a large standing army and the pervasive presence of the U.S.A. in Cuba. Castro showed others that such efforts could work. (Those who followed such leads seldom stopped to analyze all the conditions, including widespread support by the church and the general populace, that brought Castro to power.)

Moreover, Castro showcased for Latin America a new form of government and social organization, one purporting to serve the common good and the interests of the people. Again, at least from a short distance, Fidel demonstrated to Latin Americans that there was another way to run a country. (The cost of so doing was seldom stressed, nor was the extensive dependence on the Soviet Union.)

The second general influence affecting many Latin Americans, and not just those inclined to violence, was the failure of the development model. The world economic system was seen to be organized in a way that benefited the developed world and left the Third World further and further behind.

With the military takeover of the Goulart regime in Brazil in 1964, the situation began to change for Latin American political life and for the Latin American church. After 1964 other Latin American countries found their presidential palaces occupied indefinitely by the military. The rules of the political game were beginning to change, and military juntas were dictating the changes. The situation continued for some years with almost daily reminders of church-military conflict in reports from such countries as El Salvador, Argentina, and Bolivia.

Final Preparations

By January 1968, only eight months remained before the conference, and persons charged with preparations had a sense of urgency that proved highly beneficial. Because of experience with Vatican Council II, they believed the bulk of the work of the conference had to be expressed in the preparatory documents if there were to be any breakthroughs, given the relatively short duration of the conference. Conference participants thus would ratify what had been prepared for them by the core group that began its work at Bogotá on January 19 in 1979. (The Puebla conference largely reversed the process of preparatory documents and ratification.)

Up to the beginning of 1968, CELAM headquarters had received or discussed only general principles or suggestions for the conference. Now was the time to begin careful delineation of themes. Forty-three bishops, experts, and assistants participated in the ten-day meeting at the

Cristo Rey retreat center in Bogotá. They were, for the most part, CELAM insiders: bishops who were chief executives of CELAM and priests who were experts in theology, sociology, or some other field. Those who gathered for the meeting were moderates or progressives in theological or political orientation. The group included such bishops as Marcos McGrath, Avelar Brandáo Vilela, Eduardo Pironio, Lucien Metzinger, Leonidas Proaño, and Cándido Padin. The group also included richly talented persons from CELAM headquarters who worked behind the scenes at the Medellín conference and for the four years to follow. They knew one another and cooperated easily, a major change from the days preceding Vatican II.

The group started its work at the very first full plenary session when three experts, including Gustavo Gutiérrez, presented their working papers. In effect these papers mapped out the major concerns of the forthcoming conference. After that the group broke up into smaller sections to enlarge on their working papers and to compose the preliminary working document. Looking back, one can discern the outlines of the work of the sixteen commissions of the Medellín conference. The preliminary working documents would contain the main characteristics of the final Medellín document.

Within weeks the preliminary working document was sent out to national episcopal conferences for their reactions. These conferences in turn invited comments from experts or interested parties in their own countries. Consultation tended to be limited to informed persons; consultation with the grassroots was virtually nil. In their national meetings, some episcopal conferences took up the document very systematically, whereas other episcopal conferences went over the document only routinely and without much psychological engagement.

After the Bogotá meeting, which produced the working document, came the formal convening of the Medellín conference by Paul VI. With that step taken, the sending of invitations to the conference was in order.

One of the great innovations of the conference was the inviting of non-Catholic observer-delegates. The initiative came from the newly created CELAM Department of Ecumenism with its headquarters in Buenos Aires, at once the site of a largely conservative church but also a place where Protestant and Jewish communities were strong. At first it was the intention of the Roman Commission for Latin America to limit the participation of non-Catholics to the plenary sessions, but as it turned out the non-Catholic observer-delegates were authorized to participate in all sessions. Their presence proved to be highly beneficial for the proceedings and brought ecumenism in Latin America to an entirely new level.

By the beginning of May, it became clear that Paul VI himself would be coming to Colombia to inaugurate the conference (although there was some hesitation later due to the wave of assassinations taking place throughout the world that year). The press was captivated by the idea of a pope going for the first time to Latin America. Indeed the press was more interested in the person of Pope Paul than it was in the conference.

The pope's journey was one more unusual event in an unusual year. That year brought upheavals at universities in the U.S.A. and elsewhere, the assassinations of Robert Kennedy and Martin

Luther King, Jr., the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the riotous Democratic convention in Chicago, escalation of the Vietnam War, the Cultural Revolution in China, and a military revolution in Peru.

A year before his arrival, Paul issued an encyclical of great significance to those involved with social justice issues: *Populorum Progressio*. It raised many questions about the justice of the international economic system and created a climate of high expectation. Paul's interpretation of the modern economic situation paralleled many descriptions and analyses expressed later at the Medellín conference. Nonetheless Paul's visit created some apprehension and skepticism among those who were actively attempting to reshape the church in Latin America. Paul and the Vatican were seen as advocates of gradualism (the "two steps forward and one step back" formula familiar to anyone who has worked in a large-scale organization).

Increased spates of unrest marked Latin America that year. In addition to events surrounding the new military government in Brazil (a president more repressive than the previous one came to power in 1967), the church became a target elsewhere. Archbishop Mario Casariego was thought to have been kidnaped and eventually released in Guatemala. None of the events was serious enough to cancel the pope's visit or the holding of the conference but they did foreshadow a pattern of violence and repression that would become more systematic and widespread in the coming years.

Despite external difficulties and a sense of apprehension, other signs of what was to take place at Medellín promised a conference that would be more forward-thrusting than any other event in the life of the Latin American church. One such sign was that provided by Roger Schutz, prior of a Protestant religious community in Taizé, France. After he was invited to the conference, Schutz replied that he would arrive with a million Bibles in Spanish, to be followed later by a half million in Portuguese. The Bibles had been the work of an ecumenical team of scholars. Schutz also requested housing among the poor; he was to become a strong advocate at the conference for the church to stand at the side of the poor. So great is Schutz's standing now among the Latin American bishops that they gave him a standing reception at the Puebla conference.

Signals were being given off in Rome too that something special was to take place at Medellín. One of the dedicated Vaticanwatchers at the time, Robert Graham, wrote two months before the Medellín conference: "The Vatican is now confident that the groundwork laid at this meeting will make of the conference the beginning of a new phase in the life of the church." (6)

The Medellín Conference

At the time, the four-day presence of Paul VI was a great occasion for the Latin American church. But the details of his visit and indeed his addresses are now largely forgotten. With Paul's departure, the conference participants settled down to two weeks of intense activity. The immensity of the work-writing a major statement about a large-scale institution in a vast and complex environment-quickly became apparent.

The direction the conference would take was set in the opening days of the meeting by a

sociological overview and by *ponencias* on the major conference themes.(7) The "Sociography of the Continent" showed the participants a stark and realistic picture of the social and religious situation in Latin America. "The situation was much worse than we thought," bishops recalled later. From the beginning, then, the conference kept its feet on the ground. Further, the presentation created a climate of interest in and preoccupation with "temporal" themes, as Hernán Parada was later to remark.(8) He also pointed out that beginning this way kept the spirit of Vatican II alive and present. The conference was off to a flying start.

The seven *ponencias*, especially that of Pironio, ensured the theological depth of the document that the conference would issue.(9) They were well conceived and elegantly phrased. They dealt especially with the signs of the times: a continent marked by change and by institutionalized violence. After discussion of the *ponencias* the participants went on to write various versions of the conference conclusions. The final document would say, in brief, that the church is a sinful church in a sinful (unjust) society, one marked by structured inequalities. Latin America, it went on, is a region suffering from two massive evils: external dominance and internal colonialism.(10) Change was obviously called for and the church wished to take part in the change. The church chose the side of the poor. It must reach out to them, and to the whole continent. This would be accomplished through evangelization and lay participation (*pastoral de conjunto*) from which grassroots communities (*comunidades de base*) would emerge.

In the face of such a situation, the participants called for liberation:

Because all liberation is an anticipation of the complete redemption of Christ, the Church in Latin America is particularly in favor of all educational efforts which tend to free our people A deafening cry pours from the throats of millions of men, asking their pastors for a liberation that reaches them from nowhere else.(11)

When reflecting on the situation of institutionalized injustice in Latin America, the bishops at the Medellín conference agreed that the church had to choose sides. They chose the side of the poor and oppressed. Even though this would lead to the loss of support of the traditional elites, including the military, the conference participants felt that the commitment had to be made. It was, in their words, a gospel imperative. Moreover, a commitment to a horizontal, rather than a vertical, church, had to be made: during the days of Vatican II it had become clear that a communal ordering of the church was called for to bring it in line with the original mandate of Christ to his apostles. The methodology of the conference, of first presenting facts and then proceeding to scriptural and theological reflection, brought the bishops to a clear understanding of the necessity for change and commitment in a way that had never taken place before.

However, the Medellín participants did not write universally strong statements. Of the sixteen sections of the *Conclusions*, only three made a strong impact. The rest of the sections were mostly throwaways -- unimaginative statements typical of international meetings. But the three on justice, peace, and poverty acquired a life of their own in the years to come.

Reactions to the conference document varied. The Vatican approved the document and made mention of its historical importance. Paul VI confided to Eduardo Pironio, then secretary general

of CELAM: "The Latin American church had arrived at a degree of maturity and an extraordinary equilibrium that made it capable of assuming fully its own responsibility."(12) The Latin American stepchild had arrived at a maturity that had eluded it for almost five hundred years.

Other reactions, predictably, were not favorable. The document especially offended conservatives inside and outside the church. Some, of course, simply chose to ignore the document. But for many, Medellín set the Latin American church firmly on the course of Vatican II. Creative, change-minded groups in the church found in the document the inspiration they needed. The longtime observer for *Le Monde*, Henri Fesquet was to write: "Younger members of the clergy and militant lay persons found in the better passages of the conference *Conclusions* new motives for continuing their struggle and for putting up better with isolation and misunderstanding."(13)

In sum, a new ideology for the Latin American church had been born. Progressive thinkers had assumed intellectual leadership of the church and set it on a new course of change. The highest church leadership in Latin America endorsed an ideology that would become increasingly clarified and elaborated as the theology of liberation in the coming years. The shift from development to liberation, with spiritual as well as material overtones, had been made. The most important event in the modern era of the Latin American church had taken place.

The conference was not only to open a new course to the theology of liberation; it was also to express the rationale for a new church community, to open further the way for expressive movements such as the charismatic, and to put ecumenical dialogue on a new level. The conference fostered an unprecedented emergence of the laity, such as is still largely unknown in the U.S.A., Canada, or Europe.

These were major achievements of the conference. But the church at Medellín made a serious omission, one for which it would pay dearly in years to come. Medellín did not consider what effect the changes it was proposing would have on the social climate in which it had to operate. Many individuals and institutions would have to make adjustments to new *modi operandi* proposed by the church. The church did not consider what its proposed changes would mean to other political entities. And more seriously, it did not delineate a policy of dealing with the changing political environment, in which the military was becoming increasingly a major political force. The church and the military set themselves on collision course, and church navigators, with very few exceptions, did not foresee the shoals and suffering that lay ahead.

From Medellín to Puebla

When the 130 bishops approved the sections of the final document of the Medellín conference, they did so overwhelmingly: negative votes never exceeded five. Nevertheless, some bishops and other participants had reservations about the final document-indeed, about the whole direction that the conference had taken. Reactions to the conference confirmed their hesitations: persons on all sides wondered about the changes that the Latin American church proposed.

Conflict and division were to dog the church in the years to follow.(14) The conflict of viewpoints was to continue eleven years later in the meeting halls of the Puebla conference. The ensuing

debate largely centered on whether the church should be involved actively in the social, political, and economic process of change that was taking place in Latin America or whether it should limit itself to "spiritual" values. Some obviously hoped to lead the church back to where it had been before the Medellín conference.

Despite conflicts, the eleven-year period between Medellín and Puebla were filled with major achievements for the Latin American church. However, these achievements should not be allowed to mask the fact that large sections of the church changed only very gradually. Many, clerical and lay, were psychologically incapable of rapid changes. Years of training and practice in one orientation would not suddenly be reversed. Years passed before changes would become evident in some places, such as parts of Mexico and Colombia. But the important factor in the Latin American church was that change was made legitimate. Many were to seize on that legitimacy to promote changes in ideology and practice.

The changes also had a beneficial effect on relationships with the historical Protestant and Jewish communities. Observerparticipants noted from the start the change in atmosphere at the Medellín conference. At the last liturgy of the conference, Colombian television viewers watched with some amazement as five non-Catholic participants approached and received communion. When inquiries were made by the press, Archbishop Botero Salazar of Medellín responded, "It was something that was required, given the atmosphere of fellowship and participation." (15)

CELAM executives and staff members worked diligently for the four years following the Medellín conference to make known the implications of the conference. They published extensively, sponsored regional seminars, and enhanced the activities of CELAM institutes. However, after 1972 the progressive direction of the Celamistas largely ended and new personnel began to pursue a more cautious, spiritualizing tendency. The election of conservative Archbishop Alfonso López Trujillo as secretary general brought about this shift.

CELAM became increasingly less important to the spearheading groups that were guiding the church in the direction of change. The strongest networks of Christian activists were now being formed nationally. They did not involve violence, as had Camilo Torres or the Teoponte movement. They sprang up all over Latin America. The best known included ONIS (National Office of Information) in Peru, ISAL in Bolivia, the Priests for the Third World in Argentina, the Group of Eighty in Chile, and the Golconda movement in Colombia. (16)

At the same time, a much larger number of ad hoc groups appeared. Participants in these groups banded together over a single issue or event and then disbanded. Most groups issued formal statements of their positions. Local newspapers usually reprinted these statements, at least in countries where repression was less severe. Nationally and internationally, statements and position papers were passed from hand to hand and began to be collected by documentation centers. A number of the more salient and universally applicable statements appeared in collections reprinted in Latin America, the U.S.A., and Europe. (17)

Documentation centers became new major aspects of life in the church. They reflected much of what was happening in Latin America. Whereas activist elements in the church previously

established development institutes dedicated to social and religious study, after the Medellín conference activists increasingly turned their energies to more direct action through national movements such as ONIS or ISAL, or through human rights activity as members of justice and peace commissions. These commissions sprang to life following the intensification of repression in Latin America, especially in the southern tier countries of South America and in much of Central America.

Communication of what was taking place at local and national levels and interchange of ideas among activists and theologians took place through established journals, mimeographed newsletters, or position papers. These publications crossed national lines and were collected in documentation centers. These centers were either national or regional; CRIE, for example, served as the ecumenical documentation center for Central America.

The centers became focal points where main issues facing the churches could be aired. They also became targets of hostile governments or right-wing forces. Publication of the "facts" in a repressive climate made the centers highly unpopular with repressive forces. This was true even in relatively free Mexico. Following the murder of Father Rodolfo Aguilar, who had been promoting mail and sewage services in slum areas, Mexican police sacked the office of CENCOS (Center for Social Communication), which had been documenting Aguilar's work, and attempted to intimidate the director of the center.

These centers are linked in an informal network promoted at an international meeting sponsored by the journal *Christus* in Mexico City. During the Puebla conference, CRIE furnished efficient clipping and documentation service, and CENCOS provided a convergence point for conference participants, theologians, activists, and journalists.

The Puebla Conference

The death of John Paul I and the delay caused by the election of John Paul II postponed the third extraordinary CELAM conference to January 1979. This conference would take place at the Palafoxiano Seminary at Puebla, Mexico. In 1978 groups working at CELAM headquarters began preparing for the conference.

At CELAM López Trujillo, with encouragement from Vatican officials, was very much in command. He carefully selected committee members and experts to compose the preliminary working document. They produced the "green book" (from its cover), divulging a cautious, otherworldly orientation, a perspective that had been largely put aside at Medellín. Clearly an attempt at setting back the bold positions taken at Medellín was afoot. Almost universally, the national episcopal conferences rejected the document as too timid, too general, and too spiritualizing. Most felt that the green book failed to address the urgent issues of the day for Latin America and the church.

In part the bishops reacted as they did because (in contrast to preparations for the Medellín conference) they consulted, on a wide scale, with grassroots organizations in preparation for Puebla. This was to be a different kind of a meeting from that at Medellín. Medellín was a

conference controlled in large part by experts; Puebla was a conference controlled by the bishops. To be sure, the bishops were in contact with experts. But they assumed much greater leadership in the running of the Puebla conference. And there were more of them there, 191 (130 at Medellín). Their consulting with the grassroots and taking over the running of the conference would affect the rate of change in a number of Latin American churches. By and large Medellín influenced the Mexican church only minimally. Puebla had a much greater impact in Mexico and not simply because the conference took place within its borders. This time the Mexican bishops were strongly influenced by movements from below and by Mexican intellectual circles.

The change from charismatic to formal leadership is a natural evolution of change within an organization, and it was welcomed by the networks of experts who had been steering the church in that direction. Moreover, the same methodology that strongly influenced the outcome of the Medellín conference had a similar impact on the bishops and other participants at Puebla. They again began by considering the human and religious situation of Latin America, moved to biblical and theological reflection on the situation, and then proceeded to pastoral conclusions.

The description of the Latin American situation was as grim as it had been in 1968. In fact, the bishops in retrospect could see that the poor were getting poorer and new injustices in the form of infringements of human rights had multiplied. But now the bishops saw more clearly the roots of the unjust situation:

- a. We see the continuing operation of economic systems that do not regard the human being as the center of society, and that are not carrying out the profound changes needed to move toward a just society.
- b. One of the serious consequences of the lack of integration among our nations is that we go before the world as small entities without any ability to push through negotiations in the concert of nations.
- c. There is the fact of economic, technological, political, and cultural dependence; the presence of multinational conglomerates that often look after only their own interests at the expense of the welfare of the country that welcomes them in; and the drop in value of our raw materials as compared with the price of finished products we buy.
- d. The arms race, the great crime of our time, is both the result and the cause of tensions between fellow countries. Because of it, enormous resources are being allotted for arms purchases instead of being employed to solve vital problems.
- e. There is a lack of structural reforms in agriculture that adequately deal with specific realities and decisively attack the grave social and economic problems of the peasantry. Such problems include access to land and to resources that would enable them to improve their productivity and their marketing.
- f. We see a crisis in moral values: public and private corruption; greed for exorbitant profit; venality; lack of real effort; the absence of any social sense of practical justice and

solidarity; and the flight of capital resources and brain power. All these things prevent or undermine communion with God and brotherhood.

g. Finally, speaking as pastors and without trying to determine the technical character of these underlying roots, we ourselves see that at bottom there lies a mystery of sinfulness. This is evident when the human person, called to have dominion over the world, impregnates the mechanisms of society with materialistic values.(18)

Such analysis is this-worldly and antitriumphalistic, distinct changes in outlook in the Latin American church. Such a line of reasoning carries the church away from partnership with the status quo and also sets it against the military in some countries.

After this description and analysis of the human situation, the bishops began biblical and theological reflection. By 1979 the theology of liberation had achieved greater maturity, and it is thus represented in the Puebla document. The bishops defined much more fully than they had done at Medellín authentic, integral, and total liberation. The ideology of liberation undergirds their thinking.

The reception of John Paul II by the Mexican people exceeded by far the reception given earlier to Paul VI in Colombia. John Paul's visit also cemented a special relationship of the pope with Latin America, a relationship that intensified during a twelve-day visit to Brazil in mid-1980. No longer was Latin America the lost stepchild of Spain and Portugal. It was beginning to assume intellectual and moral leadership proportionate to its status as by far the most populous segment of the Catholic Church. In turn, John Paul understood that he must engage the Latin American church in discussion rather than continue the relative neglect the Vatican had contented itself with for centuries. John Paul had witnessed for himself the awakening of a giant.

The global perception of that awakening could be measured in part by the press corps that went to Mexico. The press office for the pope's visit to Mexico officially accredited some 2,200 journalists -- more than came for the Olympics in 1968. Officials shook their heads. Earlier, when Paul VI had left Colombia before the Medellín conference, many of the press also departed; those who stayed on filed routine reports from the conference. The press office at the Puebla conference accredited some 3,200 journalists, and their reporting was hardly routine.

Puebla reaffirmed the direction taken at Medellín. There would be no turning back. Indeed, the bishops at Puebla went further. They more clearly and fully committed the church to the service of the poor and spoke of its preferential option for the poor and oppressed. They also took a more explicit and stronger stand for human rights. The experience of the years since the Medellín conference had taught the church new political and moral lessons.

Also evident at Puebla was a major shift from a hierarchical to a communal church. The Puebla document describes much more fully what that church would be. In contrast to rather vague discussion at Medellín about a *pastoral de conjunto* (clerical and lay participation), the bishops at Puebla developed in considerable detail their thoughts on grassroots Christian communities, the *comunidades de base*. Indicative of the shift, many representatives of grassroots communities

were present at Puebla in person or through numerous statements communicated to the bishops. The bishops, too, faced the reality of some two million Catholics living in *comunidades de base* at the time of the Puebla conference. The church of promise at Medellín was becoming the church of fulfillment at Puebla.

Since the Puebla Conference, the Vatican through the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith has monitored closely the theologies of liberation. In August 1984 the Congregation through the initiative of Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, its prefect, issued an "Instruction on Certain Aspects of the Theology of Liberation." Many observers of Latin American theology found that no major Latin American theologian holds the views singled out for warnings, while acknowledging that some activists uncritically propound what was criticized in the statement. Leonardo Boff and other theologians welcomed the document and look forward to what it promises: another document that will detail in positive fashion the richness of this theme of liberation.

Notes

1. Norman Gall, *Pueblo de Dios* (Caracas: Monte Avila, 1970).
2. See, for example, Roberto Oliveros Maqueo, *Liberación y teología: Génesis y crecimiento de una reflexión (1966-76)* (Mexico City: Centro de Reflexión Teológica, 1977), pp. 119ff.
3. For a discussion of the notion of marginality, see Alejandro Portes, "Latin America: Social Structures and Sociology," *Annual Review of Sociology*, 7 (1981) 236-41, and Lisa Peattrie and José A. Aldrete-Haas, "Marginal Settlements in Developing Countries," *ibid.*, pp.157-75.
4. "Presencia de la Iglesia en el proceso de cambio en América Latina," *Signos de renovación* (Lima: CEP, 1969), p. 38.
5. Maryknoll, N.Y., Orbis, 1975.
6. Religious News Service, quoted in Gerald Costello, *Mission to Latin America* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1979), p. 146.
7. Hernán Prada prepared a useful chronicle of the Medellín conference, one that imparts a sense of the meeting: *Crónica de Medellín: Segunda Conferencia General del Episcopado Latinoamericano* (Bogotá: Indo-American Press Service, 1975).
8. *Crónica*, pp. 185-86.
9. Second General Conference of Latin American Bishops, *The Church in the Present-Day Transformation of Latin America in the Light of the Council, vol. 1: Position Papers* (Washington: U.S. Catholic Conference, 1970). (Volume 2: *Conclusions*.)
10. References for dependency analysis are found in chap. 3, note 25, below. Questions about internal colonialism are treated in J. Walton, "Internal Colonialism: Problems of Definition and Measurement," *Latin American Urban Research*, 5 (1975) 29-50. See also Alan Gilbert, "The State and Regional Income Disparities in Latin America," in David J. Robinson, ed., *Studying Latin America: Essays in Honor of Preston E. James* (Ann Arbor: UMI Monographs, 1980), pp.

215-44.

11. *Conclusions*, Document 4, §9, and Document 14, §2.

12. *Boletín CELAM*, nos. 15 and 16 (1968).

13. *Une église en état de péché mortel* (Paris: Grasset, 1968), p. 106.

14. Enrique Dussel composed a lengthy chronicle and analysis of the decade from 1968 to 1978: *De Medellín a Puebla: Una década de sangre y esperanza* (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios Euménicos, 1979) in English see Dussel's *A History of the Church in Latin America: Colonialism to Liberation* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1981). See also José Marins et al., eds., *Práxis de los Padres de América Latina: Documentos de las Conferencias Episcopales de Medellín a Puebla* (Bogotá: Paulinas, 1978).

15. Prada, *Crónica*, p. 233.

16. Collections of documents of social activist priests are contained in *Social Activist Priests: Chile* and *Social Activist Priests: Colombia, Argentina*, LADOC Keyhole Series, nos. 5 and 6, respectively (Washington: U.S. Catholic Conference, n.d.). The bi-monthly publication *LADOC* (Lima, Peru) regularly publishes in English statements of bishops and activist groups of Latin America. For ONIS, see Jeffrey Klaiber, *Religion and Revolution in Peru* (University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), and M. G. Macauley, "Ideological Change and Internal Cleavages in the Peruvian Church: Change, Status Quo, and the Priest: The Case of ONIS" (Notre Dame University, Ph.D. dissertation, 1972). See also Michael Dodson, "The Christian Left in Latin American Politics," in Daniel H. Levine, ed., *Churches and Politics in Latin America* (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage, 1980), pp. 111-34; Ivan Vallier, "Radical Priests and Revolution," in Douglas Chalmers, ed., *Changing Latin America: New Interpretations of its Politics and Society* (Montpelier, Vermont: Capital City Press, 1972), and Mary Mooney, "The Role of the Church in Peruvian Political Development" (University of Windsor, M.A. thesis, 1976).

17. See, for example, Peruvian Bishops Commission for Social Action, *Between Honesty and Hope* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1969); *The Church at the Crossroads: Christians in Latin America, From Medellín to Puebla, 1968-78* (New York: IDOC International, 1978); *Signos de lucha y esperanza: Testimonios de la Iglesia en América Latina, 1973-78* (Lima: CEP, 1978); Matins, *Praxis*; and back issues of *LADOC*.

18. Puebla, *Final Document*, §§ 64-70. The text cited here is the English translation authorized by the U.S. National Conference of Catholic Bishops' Committee for the Church in Latin America, contained in John Eagleson and Philip Scharper, eds., *Puebla and Beyond* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1979).